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has forced bankers into a more careful evaluation of their competitive positions.
It has been argued that nonmember banks can earn higher profits and/or offer more attractive terms to borrowers and depositors than member banks. Thus, the "cost" of membership in the Federal Reserve System is said to be borne primarily by two groups of individuals: (a) bank stockholders who, through membership in the System, forego some additional return on equity obtainable through nonmember status, and/or (b) customers of member banks who pay higher loan rates for a reduced volume of credit, increased service charges on demand deposits, and reduced remuneration for time deposits.
System reserve requirements are said to place member banks at a competitive disadvantage relative to nonmembers. Bankers, believing that bank performance can be improved by changing their membership status, have withdrawn from the System at an increasing rate in recent years. The Federal Reserve's proposal for a uniform set of reserve requirements for all commercial banks, though advanced on the grounds that it would enhance the monetary authorities' control over the nation's money supply, would reduce the costs associated with membership and could be expected to curtail the exodus of banks from the System. In the absence of such legislation, however, alternatives designed to minimize the loss in membership by eliminating its competitive disadvantages are being explored. The reduction of selected reserve requirements and the payment of interest on reserve balances held at the Fed, for example, are being examined in this respect. 'A 1 The Board of Directors of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, in a recent report [2] , endorsed and recommended to the Board of Governors both proposals as solutions to the membership problem. The present study was originally prepared for use by the Federal Reserve System Committee on Research, Public Information, and Bank Relations in their deliberations on the membership issue. This Committee has made similar recommendations. A final solution to the membership problem, if forthcoming, will most likely require legislative action.
prerequisite to implementation of such proposals, however, is knowledge of the extent to which member banks of different circumstances are penalized.
The present study will attempt to measure the cost of membership for banks of different sizes and different locations and identify particular groups of banks whose membership status is most sensitive to cost factors.
Previous Evidence
Recently, a survey of 250 banks selected randomly from all banks withdrawing from the Federal Reserve System between 1965 and 1974 asked respondents to rank several commonly discussed advantages and disadvantages of System membership. The most important advantages of membership cited by withdrawing bankers were access to the Fed's discount window and the free shipment of coin and currency while the overwhelming disadvantage was found to be restrictive reserve requirements.
2 When asked why the banks had chosen to leave the System, almost two-thirds of withdrawing banks indicated reasons involving reserve requirements. A majority of respondents cited an increase in earnings brought about by the ability to invest more cash in earning assets as the prime objective realized through withdrawal. The results were consistent for all sizes of banks and for banks in states with low, medium, and high state reserve requirements.3 This is not too surprising since withdrawals were heavily concentrated in states with less restrictive 2 Over 90 percent of the respondents listed reserve requirements as the most important disadvantage of membership (12, p. 471.
'A comparison of statutory reserve 'requirements between states is difficult considering the diversity of state requirements with respect to types of deposits covered and assets qualifying as reserves. A classification of states according to effective reserve requirements (high, medium, low), based on cluster analysis groupings, is provided in [4] . "Effective" reserve requirements refer to that portion of reserves that are required to be held in the form of nonearning assets. effective reserve requirements than the Federal Reserve and, although required reserves for nonmembers were considered high in some states, for the most part they remained below System levels even in such cases.
The results of the survey indicate that withdrawing bankers felt strongly that the high levels of System reserve requirements inhibited the performance of their banks. An expected improvement in earnings appears to have been the primary incentive for their withdrawal. This survey supports the results of empirical investigations designed to measure performance differences between member and nonmember banks and gains realized by withdrawing banks.
The "cost of membership" has been associated with the difference in the set of performance characteristics (with emphasis on profits) between the two groups. A study of Illinois banks provides a measure that probably approximates the maximum cost of membership to commercial banks [9] . Nonmember banks in Illinois, facing no state reserve requirements, experienced higher rates of return than member banks during the 1961 to 1963 period.
This was a result of nonmembers holding a higher proportion of earning assets, particularly loans, in their portfolios than members. Similar results were found in a study of banks in South Carolina [3] , a state with moderate reserve requirements. Evidence predominantly from Ohio [lo], however, found no difference between member and nonmember banks in the same size categories. Differences in performance characteristics between banks in individual states, therefore, have paralleled differences between state reserve requirements and Federal Reserve requirements. The impact of System membership on bank performance appears to increase as state reserve requirements decline relative to Fed requirements. As the impact of differential reserve requirements varies across states, the incentives for banks to withdraw -5-from the System undoubtedly differ among states.
A recent study by Rose [ll] provides further evidence that membership has imposed an opportunity cost on member banks. His results suggest that the cost of membership may also vary across deposit size classifications. Comparing rates of return for all member and insured nonmember banks within different deposit size classes, Rose found that member bank earnings were significantly lower for each category up to $100 million in deposits. No statistically significant earnings difference was detected between member and nonmember banks in larger deposit categories.
Brimmer (11 investigated the effect of changes in membership status on bank performance and found that banks leaving the Federal Reserve System decreased their cash to asset ratios and most increased their earnings ratios. Gilbert and Peterson [S] paired withdrawing banks from throughout the nation with comparable member banks and found that banks experienced lower cash holdings, more loans, and significantly higher profits following withdrawal relative to banks remaining in the System. Rose, Fraser, and Shugart [13], using a similar procedure for banks in Texas (where effective reserve requirements are considered high but less restrictive than the Fed's), also found that withdrawing banks held a larger fraction of earning assets than comparable member banks. Nonmembers did not, however, experience greater earnings due, apparently, to member banks charging higher rates on loans and fees on deposit accounts.
The paired-bank approach has provided valuable evidence on the effects of withdrawal on bank performance. 4 Rose, Fraser, and Shugart paired a sample of withdrawing member banks in Texas with a control group 4Lawrence [8] used a similar methodology in his study on the effects of bank holding company affiliation. It is not possible to quantify individual bankers' preference functions in terms of a trade-off between risk and return. Some useful generalizations, however, may be made. Profit maximizing, risk minimizing bankers prefer mOre earnings to less at given levels of risk. Similarly, less risk is preferred to more at given levels of earnings. These statements form a simplified utility function which relates the utility derived from an earnings stream to the expected level of profits (7) and a measure of risk (R) associated with that earnings stream: U * U(i?, R); au/a% > 0, au/aR < 0 . They may explain, however, why some banks remain in the System, for example, even though they experience lower profits than they could obtain through Comparing paired banks over the five-year period prior to withdrawal (while each are members) may identify distinguishing characteristics 5 The coefficient of variation, defined as the standard deviation of expected earnings over time divided by its mean, has been used frequently in recent years as a measure of relative risk [6, 7, 14, 15, 161. Since it is thought to be an appropriate measure of risk due to the variability of cash flows, the coefficient of variation of net income/equity is the measure of risk used in the present study.
'The appropriate "t" statistic is defined as where -s is the mean of the variable for the withdrawing banks, -G is the mean for the member banks, and oD is the estimated standard error of the difference between the two sample means. .0038
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- held a larger total loan portfolio and charged slightly lower loan rates than the control banks, though they had higher service charges on deposits and paid less interest on time and savings deposits. Banks that left the System in Indiana, on the other hand, paid slightly higher rates on time and savings deposits. Withdrawing banks in Illinois also exhibited some reliance on reduction in prices on bank services (lower service charges on deposit accounts). Withdrawing banks in deposit class 1 experienced higher operating expenses and, consequently, lower net operating earnings than member banks prior to withdrawal. In addition, earnings variability measures were significantly higher for these small banks relative to those retaining membership during the early period. In deposit class 2, banks that later withdrew from the System had lower operating revenue due, in part, to lower loan rates and service charges on deposit accounts relative to members prior to withdrawal. Surprisingly, though, these banks experienced slightly higher income during the earlier period. No significant difference in earnings was detected for class 3 banks but withdrawing banks had a larger coefficient of variation of net income to equity than did members within this category prior to withdrawal.
During this period, withdrawing banks in all three deposit groups held substantially less currency, coin, and reserves with the Federal Reserve than did banks that remained In the System. A change in regulatory status, presumably, would permit these banks to further reduce their non-earning cash assets.
7
Only one pair of banks in this category had total deposits exceeding $100 million at the time of withdrawal. Deposits for these two banks were approximately $150 million. .0046
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i1.248) earnings performance relative to members was detected within the largest banks. 8
Mean Cheage in Diffetence
Banks leaving the System dramatically reduced their cash balances and increased balances held with commercial banks relative to members.
They increased outstanding loans when compared with those maintaining membership. Withdrawing banks in the three categories granted, on average, 3.17 percent, 2.63 percent, and 1.73 percent more loans, respectively, than would have been expected had they remained in the System. Banks in classes 2 and 3 increased interest charged on loans slightly, while class 3 banks also increased interest paid on deposits in comparison to members.
The cost of membership, therefore, appears heaviest for member bank stockholders and customers within the smaller deposit classifications.
The incentives for withdrawal seem strongest for these banks.
summary
Statistical results support the conclusion that many member banks operate at a competitive disadvantage to similarly situated nonmembers. In The membership problem has intensified in recent years due to an increased opportunity cost of idle reserve balances (higher interest rates) and to an expansion of competition between commercial banks and depository thrift institutions [17] . The Federal Reserve System has long been aware of disadvantages imposed on member banks through its reserve requirements and, in the past, supported a legislative remedy of uniform reserve requirements for all commercial banks. In the absence of such legislation, the System is giving serious consideration to alternative proposals to reduce the cost of membership. Whether this is best accomplished through a reduction in System reserve requirements, paying interest on reserve balances held with the Fed, or by some combination of proposals is currently under review.
